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SUPREME COURT REPORT 
hilting Winds 
Court whittles away at plaintiffs' recovery of attorney fees 
BY MARGARET SANNER 
AN D CARL TOBIAS 
A Supreme Court ruling in a 
case brought by an assisted-living 
home doesn't offer much assistance 
to civil rights lawyers. 
claratory and injunctive relief, ar-
guing that the legislation violated 
the federal Americans With Dis-
abilities Act and the Fair Housing 
Act. A judge declared the case moot 
after the state legislature repealed 
the allegedly offensive provisions. 
costs that could not be collected. 
Justice William Brennan's dis-
sent claimed that this construction 
would produce skewed settlement 
incentives by exposing plaintiffs to 
greater risk of attorney fees. Such a 
result, he said, would conflict with 
congressional intent that private at-The ruling in Buckhannon 
Board & Care Home v. West Virgin-
ia , 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001), will frus-
trate plaintiffs' efforts to recover at-
torney fees in litigatiqn VHaNLQJto 
vindicate important aRaMaWLLBO
\aOSHV
such as the preventmn ©f d!sct;u.n.<· 
A Restrictive Majority torneys general rigorously enforce 
In the last two decades, the civil rights laws. 
Court has often taken a narrow view Evans v. Jeff D., 4 75 U.S. 717 
. t• J ... ' 
ion. āa . 
Butitshouldn'te'Oille1·':-'· . . 
as a big surprise. Bu'ck.;· . 
hannon is only the 
most recent of mimer:. 
ous High Court deGi 
sions since the 1980s .. 
that can complicate· 
attempts by . ' 
lawyers to secure 
torney fees. 
The Court in 
Buckhannon held 5-4 
that a litigant seeki. 
attorney fees as a preva 
ing party may recover on 
when a court awards some af-
firmative relief. Some 200 federal 
fee-shifting statutes authorize fee 
awards to prevailing parties. 
The opinion by Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist rejected the 
"catalyst theory," which posited that 
a plaintiff whose lawsuit causes a 
voluntary change in defendant's be-
havior is a prevailing party. 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
dissented, saying the majority's con-
stricted definition of prevailing par-
ty was "unsupported by precedent 
and unaided by history or logic." She 
stated that 11 of the 12 regional 
circuits had accepted the catalyst 
theory. 
The suit by an assisted-living 
home and some of its elderly occu-
pants challenged a state law re-
quiring such residents to be capable 
of reaching a fire escape. 
The plaintiffs had sought de-
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have gone' 
the other way. 
The Court's restrictive stance 
seems unlikely to change soon. A 
formidable group comprising Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices An-
thony M. Kennedy, Antonin Scalia 
and Clarence Thomas have joined 
all the cases that restricted fee-
shifting in their tenure. A fifth vote 
will likely be provided by Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor, who has con-
curred in some of their opinions. 
One of the early cases, Marek 
v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), held 
that a plaintiff suing police for the 
shooting death of his son could not 
recover attorney fees incurred after 
defendants made a settlement offer 
more favorable than the verdict 
that followed. 
At issue was whether Federal 
Rule 68 barring recovery of "costs" 
after such an offer barred attorney 
fees as well. 
The Court, looking to the stat-
ute that was the basis for the suit, 
ruled that fees were part of the 
' ' (1986), empowered District judges 
to, approve settlements of Rule 23 
: Class actions that are conditioned 
on plaintiffs' agreement to 
.. waive attorney fees. 
Brennan again dis-
('lented, asserting that 
.,'qegotiation of fee waiv-
. ·ets would contravene 
' Congress' purpose to 
encourage competent 
::-:lawyers to represent 
' ,P.e1;miless civil rights 
plaintiffs. _ 
The Court has 
LVVXHGsubsequent, 
analogous opinions. 
For example, a 1989 
decision allowed civil 
,ights plaintiffs to se-
HDWWRUQH\fees from 
g intervenors only 
'en their litigation be-
. "avLor was frivolous, unrea-
sonable or without foundation. 
And a 1991 ruling proscribed 
expert witness fee awards against 
losing parties. 
The justices similarly held in 
two separate cases that an environ-
mental law's fee-shifting provisos 
did not authorize attorney fee en-
hancements for counsel's superior 
performance or for the risk of tak-
ing a case on a contingent fee basis. 
These rulings arguably frus-
trate congressional intent in fee-
shifting statutes to encourage plain-
tiffs to act as private attorneys 
general and pursue litigation that 
vindicates substantive laws' goals, 
such as reducing pollution. 
Of course, Congress could ov-
errule the Court's decisions. Howev-
er, that prospect is improbable. 
Nowadays, Congress is clearly more 
divided and seems less concerned 
about court access than it was when 
most of the fee-shifting statutes were 
passed. 
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